Wednesday, January 31, 2007

Another Connecticut Political Prisoner for testing Free Speech?

Krayeske Pleads Not Guilty
Activist Requests Jury Trial In Case Stemming From Arrest At Inaugural Parade
January 31, 2007
By JON LENDER, Courant Staff Writer

Political activist and free-lance journalist Kenneth Krayeske Tuesday entered a not-guilty plea, requested a jury trial and saw his court case continued until March - as a new witness surfaced to dispute Hartford police officers' account of events that led to his arrest Jan. 3 while taking pictures at Gov. M. Jodi Rell's inauguration parade.

"This man did not rush into the parade at Rell as the Hartford police have said," witness Marge Nichols of Lebanon said in a written statement that Krayeske's lawyer, Norman Pattis, gave reporters before his client's appearance in Hartford Superior Court on charges of breach of peace and interfering with police.

Pattis requested, and was granted, a pretrial conference March 2 with a prosecutor, to be supervised by a judge, to discuss possible resolutions of the case. Pattis told reporters the prosecution was uncooperative, adding that Assistant State's Attorney Mark W. Brodsky did not even want to read Nichols' statement during a short conference.

When Krayeske appeared briefly in court before Judge David P. Gold, Pattis said his client "appears to be being treated differently than any other protest case that I've had."

Pattis said later if the case goes to trial, "we'll get an acquittal."

He said he wants a judge's supervision at the next conference because "I don't want to get jerked around any more than I have to."

Hartford State's Attorney James E. Thomas responded that he doesn't want to "try these cases in the press" but "I obviously disagree with those comments." Thomas said the prosecutor "may have wanted more input" before discussing case resolution.

Krayeske and about 25 supporters began their morning by demonstrating for freedom of speech in front of the nearby state Supreme Court building.

Demonstrators included Krayeske's parents, Jim and Betty Ann Krayeske of Watertown. In December, Rell appointed Jim Krayeske chairman of the Connecticut Boxing Promotion Commission, which he had been a member of for years. Jim Krayeske said he hadn't talked to Rell and did not expect her to intervene.

Then Kenneth Krayeske trooped with his backers a few hundred yards to the Lafayette Street criminal courthouse.

Nichols, the witness, took Tuesday off from her job at a Hartford insurance company to be in court.

Nichols said in her statement that at the time of the arrest, she and her sister-in-law were "right next to Ken Krayeske ... on a small traffic island." An amateur photographer, Nichols said she "mainly became aware of his presence because I found myself admiring his long telephoto lens." She said if she'd brought her camera, "both he and I would have been doing exactly the same thing - standing there quietly taking photos of the parade."

Krayeske, 34, of Hartford, said he wanted the parade photos to post on his political commentary website, which has criticized Rell.

Nichols said that as Rell passed by, "she turned toward us, smiled, waved, and continued to our left. But at the same moment, this young man, still next to me on my right, was pulled behind us into a parking lot, searched, handcuffed and led away. My sister-in-law and I were very surprised and couldn't figure out what he'd done. ... I remember being impressed by how calmly he stood as he and his camera bag were being searched. He did not resist."

She said that "he was not doing anything illegal, unless there is a law that prohibits photographing parades." In a brief interview, Nichols said she is an average, independent voter and doesn't "know much about the Green Party," for which Krayeske was the 2006 gubernatorial campaign manager.

Krayeske's Green Party activity was listed on a two-page state police security flier that was prepared on him and handed to officers patrolling the parade route Jan. 3. The flier included two color driver's license photos of Krayeske, and its second page mentioned Krayeske's 2004 anti-war protest and his invitation on an Internet blog for others to join him in protesting outside Rell's inaugural ball.

A key legislative leader, Rep. Michael Lawlor, D-East Haven, judiciary committee co-chairman, said last week that the flier made Krayeske look like "public enemy No.1" and led to an overreaction by Hartford police - who arrested him about 1:20 p.m. and held him in custody, with bail set at $75,000, for 12 hours, until it was too late for Krayeske to appear outside Rell's ball.

State Public Safety Commissioner Leonard Boyle Monday wrote a report defending state police security preparations that included Krayeske among about 10 other individuals - the others not publicly identified - "who, because of prior actions or statements, warranted interest if they appeared at the day's events."

Boyle said the decision to arrest Krayeske Jan. 3 was solely the responsibility of the Hartford police. Last week, Hartford Police Chief Daryl K. Roberts said Krayeske was arrested because he "breached the parade route" - a charge that Krayeske and at least one other witness already had denied before Nichols surfaced Tuesday with her account.

A copy of witness Marge Nichols' letter and the Hartford police report of Krayeske's arrest is available at

Contact Jon Lender at

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Click Here for more on the above theme

Legislating a solution to a Police State?

To whom it may concern on the Connecticut Legislative Public Safety Committee,

January 31, 2007

I am posting this open letter to you on

It has come to my attention there were hearings yesterday on increasing the budget and hiring more Connecticut State Police.

Didn’t the Connecticut State Police get straight, across the board F’s, from the New York State Police Internal Affairs in a 168 page report? Why then, without any real changes, do they have the audacity to ask for more money and manpower?

There should be no practicing lawyers as elected officials, especially on the Public Safety and Judiciary Committee. Lawyers make more money with more police, more arrests, more kids being taken away, more trials, more unfairness, bureaucracy, social unrest, racism, and misery. Do these elected officials of the Legislative Branch violate separations of powers rules by being cheerleaders of the Judicial Branch, taking pay from that system, while also being paid as Legislators? If they are, they aren’t serving the people. There is the ethics problem in Connecticut in a nutshell.

If a lawyer in Connecticut goes against other lawyers, prosecutors, police, or especially judges, that lawyer can be disbarred, arrested, and facing prison. Why then would lawyers break ranks, especially those holding elected office?

If a citizen writes a letter to the Governor of Connecticut about the Connecticut State Police or the Commissioner of the Connecticut State Police, the citizen complaint is passed on to that Police Commissioner with the citizen’s name and address. That citizen is placed on the Connecticut State Police “Enemies List” and police are out to arrest and cause that citizen to go to prison.

There have been thousands on that list, activist Kenneth Krayeske has probably gotten the most press. When is something going to be done about this Un-American Un-Constitutional abuse?

If a citizen proposes a law to elected officials regarding police, a liaison from the police tells legislators what they can and can’t do. What!!!???

That citizen if he or she is complaining to legislators, “Redressing Grievances”, that citizen is placed on the Connecticut State Police “Enemies List”. Write something in the newspaper critical of police, end up on the list.

Is the Connecticut State Police a Political Group with armed thugs enforcing their agenda? Is Connecticut under siege?

The Connecticut State Police target minorities and poorer whites. The racial breakdown of the Connecticut State Police seems to be disproportionately White and Male.

Rapes and other crimes go un-investigated. Police in Connecticut can be rude and threatening to those calling in for protection and service. Get mouthy about it, be placed on the list.

There are countless false arrests and victims of false imprisonment. If a citizen gets a criminal record, especially post 9-11, they may never get a decent job or apartment in their name for the rest of their lives. Separate and Unequal, and the “New Jim Crow”, is that what Connecticut should be about?

There needs to be investigations of cases of abuse by the LEGISLATURE, where victims are identified, their records expunged, and they are compensated. I would like to propose this legislation. Bribes, payoffs, and knowing someone can make a criminal record or traffic violations “disappear”, deleted. Why shouldn’t honest citizens be able to go to honest government for the same service without the bribing and hobnobbing?

For contacting Governor John G. Rowland about Connecticut State Police Misconduct, I was placed on the list and taken down. I went to a corrupt governor about corruption and then I get fried.

I was current on 3 mortgages and had a small business built up over 2 decades. I now have nothing. Corruption in Connecticut has countless victims. The children suffer for their entire lives. The economy suffers and ALL national Federal Taxpayers are funding the Connecticut Fraud.

I was arrested and convicted for resisting the beating I was taking on my own property. I am the victim of an attempted strong arm robbery, a mugging. The individual was threatening and stalking me for weeks, I couldn’t go to the police as they encourage stalking, harassing, and assaulting of those on their “Enemies List”.

The individual continued to stalk and harass me after the initial assault. He even assaulted me again in a crowed restaurant. Police were right there to arrest me when I was attacked on my property and would take hours or not even come if I made a complaint. Police refused to take my complaint and then perjured themselves in court. Judge Jonathan J. Kaplan abused his discretion in taking my case and then in sentencing me to a year in prison, 3 years probation for being the victim of a strong arm robbery forced to defend myself. I had tried to have Kaplan removed for bias in civil cases BEFORE the bogus criminal case against me.

I gave Connecticut State Senator Tony Guglielmo a 4 page list, about a paragraph each of criminals that I had tipped the Connecticut State Police about. None were followed up on which included the perpetrators of rape, drug dealers, prostitutes, stolen gun traffickers, vandals, thieves, and other common criminal parasites. The police in Connecticut prefer to go after honest, productive, taxpaying citizens if they need protection and service. Police can be too lazy and arrogant to actually protect and serve. The police are in control of the money paid them and their agenda. Those policies make all the abuse, business as usual. Imagine if any worker could decide their workload and duties, no boss, and if someone complained they end up in prison.

I applied for and probably got Federal Grants for the Connecticut State Police when they said they had not enough money and manpower to address downtown crime. I looked into getting Stafford Springs, Connecticut, grant money from the Small Cities program, which they probably got with my efforts.

My thanks was prison and the destruction of my family and losing everything I had ever worked for.

I used to own a home. I may never again. My dog was given away when I was in prison. My daughter has barely talked to me in 5 years, all for what? We had a close relationship before my false arrest and imprisonment? .

Legislators, should citizens continue to suffer and be abused by police and the rubberstamp courts in Connecticut? Should Families? Should Children?

I wish to propose legislation for Civilian Oversight of Police and to abolish Judicial Immunity for prosecutors and judges.

Please review docket # CR01-0074672. Is this clear evidence of retaliation? No one will fix it and the courts are unfair in Connecticut.

Please look into the Police Misconduct Complaints that I have lodged. Were they honestly investigated?

Should I never be able to get a decent job or a place to live in my name, ever again? Please legislate to remedy cases such as mine AND compensate victims as police and the courts certainly won't on their own.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter to you.

Steven G. Erickson,
c/o Francis C. P. Knize: 50 Sunset Pass, Wilton, Ct. 06897

The above emailed to:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

* * * *

Click Here for my complaint to the Washington DC FBI

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What are the Social Costs of Domestic Spying?

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Legislative Constitutional Armageddon

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The ‘100 Club’ for making DUI arrests

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Friday, January 26, 2007

Beyond Ridiculous

Connecticut State Police and Connecticut Police have made police misconduct all too common. You can be adducted (arrested) and beaten at Police HQ, just for making a police misconduct complaint. Colchester Connecticut Police Officers Nardella and Thomas arrested Stephen and Ian Murzin at their parents home. Their father happened to be a Hartford Detective at the time of his sons' arrest.

Stephen Murzin was home from the US Marines when he observed Phil Inkel being beaten at the Colchester Connecticut McDonald's Hamburger Restaurant. Phil Inkel had been beaten by Thomas and Nardella for having made a Police Misconduct Complaint because he observed Thomas and Nardella beating a teen for having worn baggy pants.

The Father, the Detective was harassed out of his job for wanting justice in the matter. His two sons will never be the same again, nor will they blindly trust any authority. Stephen Murzin was later stabbed 13 times by David J. Taylor, a felon on probation. Taylor, a police informant, also stabbed two other people. Taylor was not violated on probation and he did not go to prison for almost killing 3 people.

Todd Vashon, a police informant, who lost his nerve to kill either Phil Inkel or Stephen Murzin, talks about being given $10,000 cash for the murder for hire plot hatched by Colchester Connecticut Police Officers Nardella and Thomas. These police officers were never properly disciplined for such heinous behavior.

The Connecticut State Police Internal Affairs still have a policy of "Arrest and Discredit" when a citizen makes a police misconduct Complaint.

Connecticut prosecutors and judges cover up for police officers involved in misconduct and help retaliate against those that lodge police, prosecutorial, attorney, official, and judicial misconduct complaints.

The Connecticut Judiciary Committee that disciplines and confirms judges does neither as it is made up mainly of practicing lawyers that could lose their careers, face arrests and prison, be disbarred, and lose the sum total of their life's work to rule against abusive police, prosecutors, judges, and attorneys that serve the abusive system, not their clients.

A Judge feels it is ok to let this guy almost kill someone:

Connecticut State Police Record Check Database

Updated through SEPTEMBER 2006

* * * Results from DATABASE ONE * * *

Name Birth date SPBI # Sex
TAYLOR,DAVID 1974-12-02 000690777 M
TAYLOR,DAVID J 1974-12-02 000690777 M
Height Eye Color Hair Weight Race Place of Birth
Known Addresses
Address City Zip State
Verdict Date CAX Offense Offense Date Reduced to Town Jail Sentence Jail Suspended Probation Term Fine Docket #
F 53a-103 BURGLARY 3 1993-12-21
East Haddam 0002 Year(s) 0002 Year(s) 0002 Year(s)
F 53a-103 BURGLARY 3 1993-12-21
East Haddam

F 53a-60 ASSAULT 2 1994-08-26 M 53a-61 ASSAULT 3 East Haddam 0001 Year(s) 0001 Year(s) 0002 Year(s)
M 53a-125b LARCENY 6 1994-10-08

M 53a-167a INTRFERE/RESIST 1997-01-03
Colchester 0045 Day(s) 0045 Day(s) 0001 Year(s)

CAX - If this field is filled out, C = Conspiracy A = Attempt X=Accessory

Offense = M/F is Misdemeanor or Felony Indicator, What a person was charged with when they were arrested

Reduced to = M/F is Misdemeanor or Felony Indicator, What the original charges were reduced or changed to (if applicable)

* * * Results from DATABASE TWO * * *

I, Steven G. Erickson, tried to have Rockville Connecticut Superior Court Judge Jonathan Kaplan removed for bias in civil cases regarding the self-employed, contractors and landlords. I made complaints about Stafford Springs Connecticut are town and State Police. For being a victim of a strong arm attempted robbery and being assaulted on my own property, ending the beating I was taking with pepperspray, I was sentenced to a year in prison, 3 years probations, stiff fines, to see a psychiatrist twice a week (I must have been crazy to resist the felon trying to rob and kill me), drug and alcohol classes (I was not drunk or high when I was attacked and have no history, but my attacker was legally drunk when he assaulted me), a mental competency exam, and now have a criminal record preventing me from getting most employment and lodging. Where is justice in the American Justice System?

Judicial Immunity keeps Judge Jonathan J. Kaplan from being arrested and prosecuted for acting illegally and Unconstitutionally in my case. If Kaplan had sawed off my leg and I had lived, he would have done less damage to me and my family. I would still have the ability to purchase a home, health insurance, my small business built up over 2 decades, credit, a relationship with my National Honor Society Student daughter, retirement, my dog and other pets, and believe in honest, ethical courts and law enforcement.

Complaining about a judge, attorney, police officer, prosecutor, official, or one of their powerful friends can result in this:

* * * *

Added Oct. 13, 2007:

US Marine arrested for being stabbed in Connecticut

video shot Oct. 10, 2007, Steven G. Erickson interviews Stephen Murzin

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* * * *
added March 11, 2008, 9:35 PM EST

State Police Leaders Scolded

Rell Summons Leaders To Meeting In Response To Troopers' Allegations Of Retaliation

|Courant Staff WriterAn angry Gov. M. Jodi Rell dressed down more than 60 state police managers at the governor's residence in Hartford Monday, warning that the department is about to "implode" and threatening to replace managers who could not properly supervise their ranks, according to sources who attended the meeting.

"I gave state police commanders a very direct message: They need to start leading," Rell said in a written statement Monday afternoon. "This is a time of turmoil in the agency and troopers are looking to their senior officers. The people of Connecticut — and I as their governor — demand that those officers provide strong, effective guidance."

Her harsh comments came after several weeks of testimony before the state legislature by troopers who said they had been victims of blatant retaliation by state police managers for being whistleblowers.

Last week, about 200 troopers attended a hearing before the legislature's public safety committee, asking lawmakers to help stop harassment and revamp the state police. State Police Union President Steven Rief sharply criticized the agency for severely punishing troopers for misdeeds, while being lenient with managers.

On Monday afternoon, managers' police cruisers lined side streets near the governor's residence, as lieutenants, captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels, some dressed in uniform, others in suits and ties, walked together through the iron gates up to the mansion. Managers — from lieutenants up to Public Safety Commissioner John A. Danaher III — attended a mandatory emergency meeting that lasted just 15 minutes before they walked back out to their cars solemnly.

Among those who testified about retaliation last week was Det. Karen Nixon, one of the whistleblowers who filed complaints about misconduct. She said two of her supervisors called the state Department of Children and Families to her home after she had a bad reaction to a medication. Nixon testified that she felt it was retaliation for being a whistleblower in the case of Eugene Baron, a trooper who had been stopped on suspicion of drunk driving four times and let go each time by state police. Baron has since retired.

Rell said in the statement she wants commanders to "listen to line troopers and respond."

"Those issues must be dealt with aggressively, responsibly and effectively. It is important that the command staff lead their agency with fairness, innovation and enthusiasm," Rell said.

During the meeting, Rell gave her support to Danaher, who has been commissioner of the embattled agency for just over a year, saying he is a good commissioner in a long line of them, sources inside the meeting said.

Afterward, Danaher said he will be putting some policy changes in place later this week, but declined to discuss them Monday.

"They are issues I have been talking to Steve Rief about for some time, policy issues we have been discussing," Danaher said.

Rief said the union has tried to deal with some of the issues Rell spoke of for the past year.

"I'm encouraged to hear the governor has recognized something we have been saying for quite some time," Rief said.

"It's a step in the right direction and I'm glad the governor is trying to set the tone. Hopefully, today is a start where they do get the message."

Contact Tracy Gordon Fox at

More articles

comment in article:
msrp wrote:

Right. We are going to believe a so called informant, a so called wing nut(Inkel) and the two sons of a Hartford Cop(Murzin) who was arrested for stealing. OK. I guess no one elses words count except those of these scumbags or any other scum bag who makes a complaint against a cop no matter how ridiculous. And People wonder why our society is going down the toilet. It sure isn't because of the cops now is it.
YOU have no idea what you are talking about. Let me explain a few things here. I know about this case. The cop (Murzin) was arrested May 16, 1997 on his birthday for Second Degree Larceny. He was charged for something the Police Chief says is not a crime. Murzin did nothing that other officers aren't doing now. Also, Murzin was given his job back!

Want the truth? Here it is ... back in 1997 Mr. Murzin was arrested on a defective warrant signed by a Judge Koltesky.

State's Attorneys, C. Robert Satti, James Thomas, and Judge Koletsky plotted this. Why? Because they believed Murzin was sticking his nose in where it didn't belong. The warrant was shopped for and no judge would sign it, but Koletsky agreed to sign it when he got back from his vacation in Utah.

How do we know? Because a court official warned Murzin and a few others that the warrant would be singed by Kolestsky. Then voila, like magic, the warrant appeared. The case just went away on an agreement.

Murzin was to agree to not to enter Wethersfield while on duty without permission from a supervisor.

He went to his probation appointment, but the probation officer had no record of him.

Do you think everyone here is that stupid?

Look at Murzin's retirement photos.

He is sneaking up on the Wethersfield town line. Too funny.

Know what you are talking about before commenting.

* * * *
* * * *

added August 12, 2008, at 1:30 PM EST:

Steven G. Erickson interviews Stephen Murzin, May 22, 2006:

Steven G. Erickson interviews Stephen Murzin by telephone, May 11, 2006:

Todd Vashon talks about his "work" for police as a Connecticut State Registered Confidential Police Informant:

* * *
* * * *

Added May 14, 2011. Retired Hartford Connecticut Narcotics Detective Richard J. Murzin has passed away. More:


Do Police feel they can abuse and intimidate the media?

Bloggers can be violently beaten and/or just arrested on site if they are on a State Police "Enemies List" such as in Connecticut.

Citizens trying to document police misconduct and brutality, can face bogus felony and misdemeanor arrests and then can be railroaded to prison. Is this the way it should be in America?

Text with video: Esperanza Fire, Oct, 2006 : A California Highway Patrol officer does his best to prevent a news crew from covering a deadly forest fire, even ignoring his orders from dispatch to "allow the media in" and threatening instead to arrest the news crew. Federal Law prevents law enforcement from restricting the movement of the news media except that they are not permitted in a crime scene.

ADA Laws violated by Connecticut Courts

William "Bill" Mulready recently testified in front of the Judiciary Committee at the Hartford Connecticut Capitol. The two legislators in this 48 second video are also attorneys and are being paid as part of the Judicial Branch. Is that a conflict of interest? Do they even care if ADA laws are violated by the courts?

These lawyers don't even seem to be listening, don't care, and don't ask any questions. What!!!???

Do these legislators that are also lawyers do anything at all for the public, or just for themselves?

John DiBiase, Jr. on Family Matters in the Courts

Bill proposal Drafted By John DiBiase Jr.

Go to previous message|Go to next message|Delete|Inbox

Proposed H.B. No. 6288
Session Year 2007

Printer-Friendly With Notes | Printer-Friendly No Notes | Add to My Bills


To require, in any family matter, a judge to offer to appoint a guardian ad litem for any minor child or any adult with a disability.

Introduced by: Rep. Emil Altobello, 82nd Dist.

New today 2-4 days old 5 days & older
Text of Bill
Proposed Bill [pdf]

Add personalized notes to this bill. Add Notes to HB-6288
Bill History (in reverse chronological order)
Date Action Taken
Referred to Joint Committee on Judiciary
Click for Bills Similar to HB-6288
Please direct all inquiries regarding the status of bills to the House and Senate Clerks' Offices.

Connecticut Network CT-N

Note: The pdf link currently doesn't work in this post, you may email John at:


Feel free to contact us regarding police, judicial, attorney, prosecutorial, and official misconduct. Judicial Immunity that also extends to prosecutors allows massive abuse. Police misconduct complaints often go un-investigated.

The Connecticut State Police have long had a policy of "Discredit and Arrest" when a citizen makes a police misconduct complaint.

If you were to complain to the Connecticut Governor about police or the Commissioner of the Connecticut State Police, your complaint is then passed on to that Commissioner. A secret file is then initiated with secret surveillance. You are then placed on the Connecticut State Police "Enemies List". Click Here for more.

Contact me at with any suggested posts, questions, or comments.

-Steven G. Erickson a.k.a. blogger Vikingas

Chris Kennedy is an advocate for non-custodial parent's rights and for ethics and accessibility in the Judicial Branch and Courts. He can be reached at

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Saturday, January 13, 2007

Francis C.P. Knize Document

As a matter of law, there is no presumption of subject-matter jurisdiction in a statutory proceeding, such as in divorce. Subject-matter jurisdiction has been denied in this case. Until and unless the original Petitioner proves that subject-matter jurisdiction in all of its elements and in all situations have been met, and at the proper time, the court is devoid of any subject-matter jurisdiction.
D. Final Thoughts: Fraud and the Economic Loss Rule
Fraud—scienter or intentional misrepresentation—is an economic tort
primarily invoked in bargaining transactions, See 2 DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 469. and has been recognized for
centuries as a ground for recovery. To the extent that the economic loss rule
forecloses a tort claim for scienter fraud, it seems to radically change the law as ithas been traditionally applied for a very long time. And perhaps not only the law
of fraud but also the law of mistake, because innocent mutual and basic mistakes,
whether generated by misrepresentation or not, would have traditionally warranted
rescission74 and in contemporary law would warrant damages that are more or less
equivalent to the costs of rescission. . 2 DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 483.

Conversion of or trespass to intangibles, not possible in earlier law, are
now sometimes accepted as torts. Negligent interference with intangibles that
causes economic harm can easily be imagined.

., Fifield Manor v. Finston, 354 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1960) (holding that
subrogation for a transferee’s loss would in effect permit assignment of a personal injury
claim in violation of law).mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
"[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964). Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on
public issues occupies the "`highest rung of the heirarchy of First
Amendment values,'" and is entitled to special protection. NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 467 (1980).

the commands of King George III
still apply and to speak out against a judge of the Court
of King's Bench, is still considered treason because
it is lawful for a judge to violate your rights as underthe common law of England, a judge is granted this privilege
by the King and even Judges in Colorado are above the law
and even though the First Continental Congress revoked
the commands of King George III
still apply and to speak out against a judge of the Court
of King's Bench, is still considered treason because
it is lawful for a judge to violate your rights as under
the common law of England, a judge is granted this privilege
by the King and even Judges in Colorado are above the law
and even though the First Continental Congress revoked
immunity for judges in 1774 by a POSITIVE REVOCATION
OF SAME, immunity for judges in 1774 by a POSITIVE REVOCATION
is, in
> > fact, legally bound by her oath(s) as a public servant, officer of the
> court and as an attorney to the constitution of the United States of American and
> by the constitution of the state of Florida to be directly and fully
> accountable to me as "One of the People" of the state of Florida pursuant to her lawful
> > contractual obligation (by contract see: oath(s)) and public duty. See: "

lllllllllllllllllllllllbut government employees can be dismissed when the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of their job. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-278, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1915-1916, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968).
government employees can be fired for that reason." Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103
> S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). "Equitable estoppel, and/or estoppel in pais, is applied in this case, because conduct committed by you and other officers of the court in your
willful failure to prove an otherwise important fact
acting "corporately" as an officer of the court through the corporation
> > known as the Corporate State of Florida -
> > See: Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708-10 (2d Cir.
> 1983)
> > held that the employees' refusal to testify was akin to a vicarious
> admission by Brink's. And Cerro Gordo Charity v. Fireman's Fund American Life
> > Insurance Co., 819 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1987). And HALE v. HENKEL, 201
> U.S. 43 (1906)
he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a
> corporation.
> > As the combination or conspiracies provided against by the Sherman> antitrust
> > act can ordinarily be proved only by the testimony of parties thereto, in
> > the person of their agents or employees, the privilege claimed would
> > practically nullify the whole act of Congress. Of what use would it
> be for
> > the
> > legislature to declare these combinations unlawful if the judicial
> power may
> > close
> > the door of access to every available source of information upon the
> subject?
> > Indeed, so strict is the rule that the privilege is a personal one that it
> > has been held in some cases that counsel will not be allowed to make the
> > objection. We hold that the questions should have been answered.".
> > estoppel
> > arises where Dorothy Hauge is under a duty to another to speak or
> failure to
> > speak is inconsistent with honest dealings and is acting in bad faith.
> See:
> > Silence, to work "estoppel", must amount to bad faith, Wise v. United
> > States, D.C.Ky., 38 F.Supp. 130, 134; and, elements or essentials of such
> > estoppel> > include: change of position to prejudice of person claiming estoppel,
> > Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87, 91; damages if the
> estoppel
> > is
> > denied, James v. Nelson, C.C.A.Alaska, 90 F.2d 910, 917; duty and
> opportunity
> > to
> > speak, Merry. V. Garibaldi, 48 Cal.App.2d 397, 119 P{.2d 768; 771;
> ignorance
> > of the facts by person claiming estoppel to alter his position;
> knowledge of
> > facts and of rights by person estopped, Consolidated Freight Lines v.
> > Groenen,
> > 10 Wash2d 672, 117 P.2d 966, 968; misleading of party claiming estoppel,
> > Lincoln v. Bennett, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 632, 636; reliance upon
> silence
> > of
> > party sought to be estopped, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Talley, C.C.A.
> Iowa,
> > 72 F.2d 715, 718."
> > "Estoppel by Acquiescence" See: "Acquiescence is a species of estoppel.
> > An estoppel arises where party aware of his rights sees other party acting
> > upon mistaken notion of his rights. Injury accruing form> one's acquiescence
> > in
> > another's action to his prejudice creates "estoppel". Lebold v. Inland
> > Steel Co., C.C.A.Ill., 125 F.2d 369, 375. Passive conduct on the part
> of one
> > who
> > has knowledge of the facts may be basis of estoppel Winslow v. Burns, 47
> > N.M. 29, 132 P.2d 1048, 1050. It must appear that party to be
> estopped was
> > bound in equity and good conscience to speak and that party claiming
> estoppel
> > relied upon acquiescence and was misled thereby to change his position
> to his
> > prejudice. Sherlock v. Greaves, 105 Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87, 91.
> "Silence is a
> > species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the
> > existence of facts in question. When silence is of such character and
> under
> > such
> > circumstances that it would become a fraud, it will operate as an
> > Estoppel."Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932
> > law of land and has previously ruled on in stating 'Such is the power, and> > therefore one would naturally expect that the law to warrant it should be
> > clear
> > in proportion as the power is exorbitant. If it is law, it will be
> found in
> > our books; if it is not to be found there it is not law. BOYD v. U S, 116
> > U.S.
> > 616 (1886) and Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391.
> > Notification of legal responsibility is "the first essential of due
> process
> > of
> > law."
> Dorothy Hauge's silence is her admission of facts and of truth in my case.
> > See: U.S. Ex Rel. Bilokumsky v. TOD, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) "Conduct which
> > forms
> > a basis for inference is evidence. ... were proved by evidence to which
> > there was no objection. Silence [263 U.S. 149, 154] is often
> evidence of
> > the
> > most persuasive character." Runkle v. Burnham, _153 U.S. 216, 225 _
> >
> (
> > =216#225) , 14 S. Sup. Ct. 837; Kirby v. Tallmadge, _160 U.S. 379, 383_
> >
> (
> > nvol=379#383) , 16 S. Sup. Ct. 349. Compare Quock Ting v. United States,
> > _140 U.S. 417, 420_
> >
> (
> > , 11 S. Sup. Ct. 733, 851. As stated in
> > U.S. Ex Rel. Bilokumsky v. TOD, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) "Because the order is
> > unsupported by legal evidence; because the hearing was unfair; and
> because the
> > original warrant issued without probable cause" and governs my case on the
> > same grounds since the order of a "void" final judgment was issued and is
> > "void" of any evidence.
> > RULE 4-3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL (a) False Evidence; Duty to
> Disclose.
> > A lawyer shall not knowingly:
> > (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
> > (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
> > necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
> > (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
> > jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
> position of
> > the
> > client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
> > (4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer testimony
> > or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may not
> offer
> > testimony that the lawyer knows to be false in the form of a narrative
> unless
> > so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
> > thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
> > remedial measures.
> >
> > Nor has it ever been determined that the Sarasota Circuit Court ever had
> > proper jurisdiction in this matter. See: HANFORD v. DAVIES, 163 U.S. 273
> > (1896)> > "It is well settled that as the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the
> > United States is limited in the sense that it has no
> other jurisdiction than
> > that
> > conferred by the constitution and laws of the United States, the
> presumption
> > is that a cause is without its jurisdiction, unless the contrary
> > affirmatively appears, and that it is not sufficient that jurisdiction
> may be
> > inferred
> > argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but the averments
> should be
> > positive."

In addition, this letter will serve as an official notice of demand, not
> > request, for the Dorothy Hauge to respond within the next 20 days for the
> > production of law regarding her previous recommendations made in open
> court,
> > production of law that a public servant is not permitted to response
> pursuant
> > to
> > your letter dated 4/24/07, certified copies of her oath(s) and any
> official
> > reporting of any violations observed by her, against me by any judge,
> officer
> > of
> > the court and attorney to the proper authorities. She is hereby
> required to
> > produce any laws and statutes to support and validate your allegation in
> > stating "the magistrate is not permitted to respond to letters sent
> directly
> > to
> > her and, thus not able to take any action... If Dorothy Hauge continues to
> > remain silent, her willful non-compliance may be deemed as fraud upon
> herself
> > and upon the court and is applying the doctrine of Venire contra factum
> > proprium (No one may set himself in contradiction to his own previous
> > conduct) by
> > her continued silence as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings -
> U.S. v.
> > Tweel, 550 F. 2d. 297. "Silence can only be equated with fraud where
> there
> > is a
> > legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be
> > intentionally misleading." And U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d. 1021; We cannot
> > condone this shocking conduct... If that is the case we hope our
> message is
> > clear.
> > This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it
> > should be corrected immediately." And Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P.
> 2d. 155,
> > 135
> > Ariz. 480(1983). "Fraud and deceit may arise from silence where there is a
> > duty to speak the truth, as well as from speaking an untruth." And "It
> may be
> > that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest form; but illegitimate and
> > unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely, by
> > silent
> > approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can
> > only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional
> provisions for
> > the
> > security of persons and property should be liberally
> construed. A close and
> > literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
> > gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
> > substance. It is the duty of the Courts to be watchful for the
> Constitutional
> > Rights of the Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
> > Their
> > motto should be Obsta Principiis." BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
> If her
> > non-response is based on a local star-chamber decision then it is
> invalidate.
> >
> > Dorothy Hauge is a public servant by legal status and occupational title
> > pursuant to her oath(s). She has a public duty and legal obligation to
> > address
> > any type of correspondence addressed to her that she posses "first-hand
> > knowledge" of. As stated previously in open court and in front of two
> > witnesses (FL
> > Const. Art 1, sec 20) which was included on and for the record, that
> she had
> > read this entire case from beginning to end and in fact, can be a witness
> > for me in the contents of this official case file. See: _United States v.
> > California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)_
> >
> (
> > "The Government, which holds its
> > interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be
> > deprived of
> > those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for
> private
> > disputes over individually owned pieces of property; and officers who
> have no
> > authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct
> > cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence,
> > laches,
> > or failure to act.
> > Dorothy E. Hauge need not worry in feeling that she is being singled
> out in
> > this matter out since all parties in this case from its inception,
> including
> > but not limited to, every judge, every hearing officer and every attorney
> > with be faced with addressing each and every question on each issue in
> > similar
> > letters that have been formulated that has reflected their specific
> conduct
> > in
> > this case. See: U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) "No man in this country
> > is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set
> that law
> > at
> > defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the
> highest
> > to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It
> is the
> > only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
> > accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly
> > bound to
> > submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes
> > upon
> > the exercise of the authority which it gives."
> > If you disagree with anything in this letter, and with your
> admissions, then
> > rebut that with which you disagree, in writing, with particularity, to me,
> > within 20 days of this letter's date, and support your disagreement with
> > evidence, fact and law. Furthermore, you have been
> previously requested to
> > produce
> > a certified copy of your oath(s) which has not yet been received. Do not
> > send back this letter and the original admissions letter. In addition, the
> > admission letter was, in fact, sent by certified mail and was, in fact,
> > opened and
> > read. My official notification and demand to respond letter was sent on
> > March 26th 2007 which the 20 days has lapsed and now has become
> admissions by
> > Dorothy Hauge, which is a continuance of demand to respond letter. Do not
> > send
> > back the admissions letter because it is now, it fact, a legal and binding
> > agreement IN ANY COURT. Dorothy Hauge has within the required
> time frame to
> > respond as indicated in the April 23rd Admissions letter (by May 14th
> 2007)
> > and
> > make any corrections necessary. If no corrections are re-established or
> > rebutted within the required time frame then Dorothy Hauge's
> admissions will,
> > in
> > fact, become an affidavit of truth and of facts in this case based on
> > testimony through her willful silence which is evidence on its own
> merits and
> > behavior.
> >
> > Your failure to respond, as stipulated, is your agreement with
> and admission
> > to the facts and that everything in my previous letters are true, correct,
> > legal, lawful, and is your irrevocable agreement attesting to this, fully
> > binding upon you, in any court in America, without your protest
> or objection
> > or
> > that of those who represent you. Darren Michaels reserves the right to
> amend
> > the notice and demand to respond letter at any time.
> >
> > All Rights Reserved,
> >
> >
> > Darren Michaels,
> > A Florida state Citizen and "One of the People"
> > PO Box 18893,
> > Sarasota, FL 34276
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to be the
> > above-named
> > Respondent by certified U.S. mail # ___________________________________
> > this 23rd day of April, 2007
> >
> > By: __________________________________
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Footnotes:
> > Florida Rules of Professional Conduct - Preamble: A Lawyer's
> > Responsibilities
> >
> > Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a
> > basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that
> > disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the
> basis of
> > the facts
> > and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in
> question in
> > recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or
> > incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that
> > whether
> > discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a
> > sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and
> > seriousness of
> > the violation, extenuating factors, and whether there have been previous
> > violations.
> >
> > "Fraud" or "Fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive
> and not
> > merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of
> relevant
> > information.
> > "Knowingly," "Known," or "Knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
> > question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
> > "Lawyer" denotes a person who is a member of The Florida Bar or otherwise
> > authorized to practice in any court of the State of Florida.
> >
> > Rule 4-3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
> > A _lawyer_
> >
> (
> shall
> > not:
> > (a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or otherwise
> > unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material
> that the
> > _lawyer_
> (
> > _knows_
> (
> or
> > _reasonably should know_
> >
> (
> > is relevant to a pending or a
> > _reasonably_
> >
> (
> > foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist another person to
> > do any such act.
> > (b) fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or
> > offer an inducement to a witness, except (c) _knowingly_
> >
> (
> disobey an
> > obligation under the
> > rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion
> that no
> > valid obligation exists.
> > (d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or
> > intentionally fail to comply with a legally proper discovery request
> by an
> > opposing
> > party.
> > (e) in trial, allude to any matter that the _lawyer_
> >
> (
> does
> > not reasonably believe is
> > relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert
> > personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a
> witness, or
> > state a
> > personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a
> > witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence
> of an
> > accused.
> > (f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily
> giving
> > relevant information to another party unless:
> > (1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a
> client, and
> > (2) it is _reasonable_
> >
> (
> > to _believe_
> >
> (
> that
> > the person's interests will not be
> > adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
> > (g) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal
> > charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
> > (h) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
> disciplinary
> > charges under these rules solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
> >
> > Rule 4-8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct
> > (a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers.
> > A _lawyer_
> having
> > knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
> > Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a _substantial_
> >
> (
> > question as to
> > that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
> > respects
> > shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
> > (b) Reporting Misconduct of Judges.
> > A _lawyer_
> >
> (
> having
> > knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable
> > rules of judicial conduct that raises a _substantial_
> >
> (
> > question as to the
> > judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
> >
> > Rule 4-8.4 Misconduct
> > A _lawyer_
> >
> (
> shall
> > not:
> > (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
> > _knowingly_
> (
> > assist
> > or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
> > (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
> > trustworthiness, or fitness as a _lawyer_
> >
> (
> in
> > other respects;
> > (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, _fraud_
> >
> (
> , deceit,
> > or misrepresentation;

[click here] for document continued

CP 2

> > (d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
> > prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to _knowingly_
> >
> (
> , or through
> > callous
> > indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants,
> > jurors,
> > witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including,
> but not
> > limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national
> origin,
> > disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status,
> > employment, or physical characteristic;
> > (e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
> agency or
> > official;
> > (f) _knowingly_
> >
> (
> assist a
> > judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of
> > applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law;
> >
> > (a) False Evidence; Duty to Disclose. A lawyer shall not knowingly:
> > (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
> > (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
> > necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
> > (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
> > jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
> position of
> > the
> > client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
> > (4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer testimony
> > or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may not
> offer
> > testimony that the lawyer knows to be false in the form of a narrative
> unless
> > so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
> > thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
> > remedial measures.
> >
> > Constitutional requirements
> > The general rule--that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury
> > with respect to a material fact, even that of a client--applies to defense
> > counsel in criminal cases, as well as in other instances. However, the
> > definition
> > of the lawyer's ethical duty in such a situation may be qualified by
> > constitutional provisions for due process and the right to counsel in
> > criminal
> > cases.
> >
> > Refusing to offer proof believed to be false
> > Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse to offer testimony or
> > other proof that the lawyer believes is untrustworthy. Offering such
> proof
> > may
> > reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the
> quality of
> > evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate.
> >
> > A lawyer may not assist the client or any witness in offering false
> > testimony (Including by not limited the Florida Dept of revenue) or other
> > false
> > evidence, nor may the lawyer permit the client or any other witness to
> > testify
> > falsely in the narrative form (F.S. 90.108). If a lawyer knows that the
> > client
> > intends to commit perjury, the lawyer's first duty is to attempt to
> persuade
> > the client to testify truthfully. If the client still insists on
> committing
> > perjury, the lawyer must threaten to disclose the client's intent to
> commit
> > perjury to the judge. If the threat of disclosure does not successfully
> > persuade
> > the client to testify truthfully, the lawyer must disclose the fact
> that the
> > client intends to lie to the tribunal and, per 4-1.6, information
> sufficient
> > to prevent the commission of the crime of perjury.
> >
> > The lawyer's duty not to assist witnesses, including the lawyer's own
> > client, in offering false evidence stems from the Rules of Professional
> > Conduct,
> > Florida statutes, and caselaw.
> > Rule 4-1.2(d) prohibits the lawyer from assisting a client in conduct that
> > the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or fraudulent.
> > Rule 4-3.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from fabricating evidence or assisting a
> > witness to testify falsely.
> > Rule 4-8.4(a) prohibits the lawyer from violating the Rules of
> Professional
> > Conduct or knowingly assisting another to do so.
> > Rule 4-8.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from committing a criminal act that
> > reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
> fitness as a
> > lawyer.
> >
> > Rule 4-8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving
> > dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
> > Rule 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is
> > prejudicial to the administration of justice. (lack of Due Process of Law)
> > Rule 4-1.6(b) requires a lawyer to reveal information to the extent the
> > lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent a client from
> committing a
> > crime.
> >
> > This rule, 4-3.3(a)(2), requires a lawyer to reveal a material fact to the
> > tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
> > fraudulent act by the client, and 4-3.3(a)(4) prohibits a lawyer from
> > offering false
> > evidence and requires the lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures when
> > false material evidence has been offered.
> > Rule 4-1.16 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the
> > representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional
> > Conduct or law
> > and permits the lawyer to withdraw from representation if the client
> persists
> > in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
> > fraudulent or repugnant or imprudent. Rule 4-1.16(c) recognizes that
> > notwithstanding good cause for terminating representation of a client, a
> > lawyer is obliged
> > to continue representation if so ordered by a tribunal.
> > To permit or assist a client or other witness to testify falsely is
> > prohibited by section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1991), which makes
> perjury in
> > an
> > official proceeding a felony, and by section 777.011, Florida Statutes
> > (1991),
> > which proscribes aiding, abetting, or counseling commission of a felony.
> >
> > Florida caselaw prohibits lawyers from presenting false testimony or
> > evidence. Kneale v. Williams, 30 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1947), states "that
> > perpetration of
> > a fraud is outside the scope of the professional duty of an attorney
> and no
> > privilege attaches to communication between an attorney and a client with
> > respect to transactions constituting the making of a false claim or the
> > perpetration of a fraud." Dodd v. The Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d 17 (Fla.
> 1960),
> > reminds us that "the courts are dependent on members of the bar to
> present
> > the true
> > facts of each cause to enable the judge or the jury to [decide the
> facts] to
> > which the law may be applied. When an attorney allows false testimony,
> (the
> > attorney) makes it impossible for the scales of justice to balance."
> See The
> > Fla. Bar v. Agar, 394 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1981), and The Fla. Bar v.
> Simons, 391
> > So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1980).
> >

Under Fed. R.Civ.P.55(c)
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
Judgment has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b).

Under Fed.R.Civ.P 60(b)
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
Of a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or procee-
dings for the following reasons.
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);(3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-
tion, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.

whether rights arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 36 Stat. 291, 45 U.S.C.A. 51 et seq., could 'be enforced, as of right(1) any deliberate violation of law; (2) fraud or conspiracy; (3) intentional violation of due process of law; (4) deliberate disregard of material allegations; (5) judicial acts without jurisdiction; (6) blocking of a lawful conclusion of a case; and (7) any deliberate violation of the Constitutions of the state or the United States
INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314; conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery..........Hobbs Act jurisdictional allegations contained in the indictment. The government was required to prove two essential elements to support the Hobbs Act offense alleged in Count 1-"interference with [interstate] commerce, and extortion." Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 , 80 S.Ct. 270, 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 252, 257 (1960). Proof of a connection to interstate commerce is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Hobbs Act conviction. United States v. Alexander, 850 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068 , 109 S.Ct. 1346, 103 L.Ed.2d 814 (1989),
A judge does not have discretion on whether to follow Supreme Court Rules ("SCR"); a judge has a duty to follow SCR. People v. Gersh, 135 Ill.2d 384 (1990). Apparently Judge Mathein has no respect for judges of higher courts; she prefers to rule by the rule of man/woman, rather than the rule of law.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has previously ruled that whenever any judge unlawfully interferes with a person's right to conduct interstate commerce, the judge is guilty of interference with interstate commerce. This Respondent's right to conduct interstate commerce without any restriction has been interfered with by Judge Mathein not complying with Illinois law.
The state judge, however, did nothing to discharge her constitutional duty of care. Id., at 614. In the one case in which we have devised a remedy for such judicial dereliction, we held that the ensuing judgment of conviction must be reversed and the defendant afforded a new trial. Holloway, supra, at 491; see also Wood, supra, at 272, n. 18. That should be the result here. The error occurred when the judge failed to act, and the remedy restored the defendant to the position he would have occupied if the judge had taken reasonable steps to fulfill his obligation

need to be served Due Process Notices such as a Declaration "Affidavit of Commercial Truth", Bill of Particulars, Discovery Disclosure (Subpoena Duces Tecum, See Below), a Show Cause why tort of fraud and deceit [dolus malice] should not issue, and a surety bond with criminal charges assessed" served up to them by Notarial process, bringing the actor/offender into Commercial Dishonor and extra-judicially forcing LIQUIDATION OF THEIR ASSETS!!!!!
Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1746. Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury

Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation,
order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or
permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn
declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in
writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath
of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other
than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be
supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration,
certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is
subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in
substantially the following form:
(1) If executed without the United States: ``I declare (or certify, verify,
or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).
(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or
commonwealths: ``I declare (or certify, verify, or
state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. nnnnnnn
The subpoena duces tecum should be contained within a motion titled “motion for discovery and compulsory production of the documents by subpoena duces tecum.” Once served with the motion for compulsory production of documents, the originals are returned to the court and made part of the record, along with a certificate of service. Since the subpoena duces tecum, a common law writ, issues out, under the seal of the court and the signature of the clerk, at your behest, this effectively opens your court. This always triggers a flurry of activity, usually in the form of a motion to quash the subpoenas. If you are the defendant, which you probably are, you must oppose the motion to quash on the grounds that it is your discovery. The tribunals (courts are judicial, tribunals are administrative) really don’t have the authority to quash your subpoenas because they are your common law writ, however, they usually issue an order granting the motion to quash.
You don’t have to know the actual title of the document needed. You can subpoena documents by content, such as “produce a true copy of the contract between the judge and the State of . . . . . . “ or “the affidavit of the accusing officer swearing to my liability to code section . . . .” These are specific enough to be pulled from any record that they may exist within. Another little touch is to add the statement, “If no such document exists, please so declare for the record in this action.” And always state the document is needed for discovery. More than one document can be called out on one subpoena, if they are in the care, control and custody of the same person. Just as the subpoena duces tecum is for specific documents, they are also served on specified, designated individuals. Those individuals can be designated either by name or position, such as “John Mays Smith” or “Director
The continued debt owed to the people is discharged only as it continues not to violate our private rights, and when government fails in its duty to provide protection-discharge its debt to the people, it is an abandonment [delictual fault] of any and all power, authority or vestige of sovereignty which it may have otherwise possessed, and the laws remain the same, the sovereignty reverting to the people whence it came." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
When a government agent trespasses on our private rights, it is a tort and this creates a liability for the government to compensate us for that injury. This comes about because the citation shows no liability of the defendant to the statute they claim you violated. They failed to state a claim because without a swearing to liability there is no claim. I use a traffic citation here as an example because all of the other entanglements with government are handled the same way. IRS, BATF and all the rest of the alphabet soup use the same procedure. On the U.S. level they get a lot more verbose and the paper work is multiplied by a factor of about ten, but the procedure remains the same. Probably the major difference is the U.S. agents will submit an affidavit to either support a claim or to get a "warrant" for someone's "arrest". They will use up several pages swearing that the grass is green and the sky is blue and that water runs down hill. What they will never swear to, is the liability of their target. Usually in such operations the "judge" will require mutual discovery. Once, a friend of mine was going through an IRS prosecution and received a stack of paper nearly 11 inches high as discovery. It was a very impressive compilation of documents, but nowhere in it was anything documenting any liability. The "judge", even though he was operating as a magistrate for the executive branch of government, (a police court) was obligated to inform the defendant of his liability. (The nature and cause of the accusations). He failed to do that. The failure to do this turns the "court" into a kangaroo court (see above) and creates an additional injury. It is a FELONY to use one’s office, de facto or otherwise, in the capacity of a “Debt Collector” to collect a debt without the requisite evidentiary proof of the debt giving rise to the obligation and the resulting liability. Ever hear of “RICO,” or read 18 U.S.C. '' 1951-1968; Page 10 of 17 particularly ' 1961(3)]. Without showing liability on the face of the instrument, the prosecution has failed to state a claim. Under the FDCPA, 28 U.S.C. '' 3001 et seq., without verification of the debt, upon timely demand therefore, SCIENTER and FELONY FRAUD ensues.
A claim is really the affidavit swearing to the liability of the defendant. A "warrant" issued without an affidavit of liability is not a warrant at all. The best that can be said of it is that it is an order to kidnap. To be a real warrant it must be issued upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation (affidavit of liability sworn to by a competent witness). This is what gives the court subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Without the swearing to liability by a competent witness, no court or tribunal can have jurisdiction. It is only the swearing to the liability, whether it is contractual, statutory or anything else that can support a charge of a violation of any kind. If you have no contractual liability, then you cannot violate or breach any contract. If you are not engaged in an activity that renders you liable and therefore subject to a statute, then you have no liability to that statute and therefore lack the requisite intent [mens rea is not longer required, i.e., did you or did you not do the act?] or capacity to violate it. Liability is the only thing that can form a basis for, or give rise to, any charge. The liability of the defendant must be discovered by him and presented, for him to be correctly informed of the nature and cause of any charges or accusations he must face. The failure and refusal to present this liability is a severe tort that must be redressed. Without the swearing to liability an "arrest" is actually a kidnapping. [Kidnap, v. 1 to carry away for the purpose of denying a right. Bouviers law dictionary.] Without the swearing to the liability any "trial" in any court or tribunal is a mockery. Justice is disregarded, perverted and parodied. The refusal(s) to verify the liability and resulting kidnap prevents any lawful process. The court or tribunal is characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, so as to render a fair or impartial [meaningful] proceeding impossible.
Before we leave the topic of liability let's look at the least understood use of a tool to discover liability. Bankruptcy is the best tool there is to discover liability. The whole operation of Bankruptcy is set up to discover liability. It is seldom operated that way, but it is extremely useful tool. The petitioner is really in charge if he hasn't been saddled with an attorney. In bankruptcy the "debtor", or the one filing the voluntary petition, simply places all of his assets in the hands of a trustee to protect while he discovers all of his liability. If the trustee does not properly protect your assets, he is subject to the tort claim act and also he has a bond that can be claimed. The petitioner lists all of the debts that he owes. If there is a question about some claims that have been clogging your mailbox, simply do not list them. If you list someone as a creditor then you have the burden of proof that you do not owe them. It is you that decides who is and who is not a creditor. You send out the proof of claim forms (form 10's) to everyone that might actually have a claim so they may present any evidence of debt they have. Any form 10 returned to the court must be accompanied by evidence of debt or it is a fraud. The meeting of the secured creditors provided for under section 341 of the Bankruptcy code (usually referred to as the 341 meeting) is the time and place for presentment of any liability held and for the petitioner to examine the evidence of debt presented for payment. This is the place where the petitioner gets a chance to look beyond the document presented and either reconfirm or repudiate any liability. This is true even if there is a judgment presented. Judgments must be supported by an affidavit swearing to your liability, or based upon facts presented to the court, in order for the judge to have authority to sign them. Otherwise they are a fraud.
Connecticut Federal Civil False Claims Act & Qui Tam Law (Whistleblower Litigation) News

complaint counter claim or third party claim
motion third party defendants f later
third party defendants s are judges and members, permission from first day limited after answer.
motion for stay 2 weeks
summons form civil sup ct jd-cv-1-revised 1-2000 notice of removal direct
to district
motion to proceed ifp
removal form original court with Motion to for court obtain complete files
pleading pending- no pending motions
mot to request file from orig state
cert of service to company
state courts notice of removal state form complaint attached pleading motion

DEFENDANT’’S MOTION TO REMOVE TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT. Motion to judge to obtain a copy of the file for cases: 1,2.3
1. The complaint may be filed with the Clerk at Bridgeport, Hartford, or New
Haven. All other papers shall be filed at the seat of Court where the docket is
maintained for the case involved.
2. All civil complaints submitted to the Clerk for filing shall be accompanied by a
summons and a Civil Cover Sheet, Form JS 44a or JS 44c. Complaints not
accompanied by a summons and these forms may be rejected for filing by the Clerk.
Upon request the Clerk's office will furnish these forms. Persons filing civil complaints who are in custody at the time of filing, and persons filing pro se, are exempted from the requirements of this paragraph. A Civil Cover Sheet indicating that a jury trial is desired shall not suffice as a demand for jury trial. WHAT DOES????
(b) Place of Filing; Number of Copies

must be filed with the original.

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