Saturday, January 13, 2007

CP 2

> > (d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
> > prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to _knowingly_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#know#know)
> , or through
> > callous
> > indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants,
> > jurors,
> > witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including,
> but not
> > limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national
> origin,
> > disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status,
> > employment, or physical characteristic;
> > (e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
> agency or
> > official;
> > (f) _knowingly_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#know#know)
> assist a
> > judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of
> > applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law;
> >
> > RULE 4-3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
> > (a) False Evidence; Duty to Disclose. A lawyer shall not knowingly:
> > (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
> > (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
> > necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
> > (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
> > jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
> position of
> > the
> > client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
> > (4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer testimony
> > or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may not
> offer
> > testimony that the lawyer knows to be false in the form of a narrative
> unless
> > so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
> > thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
> > remedial measures.
> >
> > Constitutional requirements
> > The general rule--that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury
> > with respect to a material fact, even that of a client--applies to defense
> > counsel in criminal cases, as well as in other instances. However, the
> > definition
> > of the lawyer's ethical duty in such a situation may be qualified by
> > constitutional provisions for due process and the right to counsel in
> > criminal
> > cases.
> >
> > Refusing to offer proof believed to be false
> > Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse to offer testimony or
> > other proof that the lawyer believes is untrustworthy. Offering such
> proof
> > may
> > reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the
> quality of
> > evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate.
> >
> > A lawyer may not assist the client or any witness in offering false
> > testimony (Including by not limited the Florida Dept of revenue) or other
> > false
> > evidence, nor may the lawyer permit the client or any other witness to
> > testify
> > falsely in the narrative form (F.S. 90.108). If a lawyer knows that the
> > client
> > intends to commit perjury, the lawyer's first duty is to attempt to
> persuade
> > the client to testify truthfully. If the client still insists on
> committing
> > perjury, the lawyer must threaten to disclose the client's intent to
> commit
> > perjury to the judge. If the threat of disclosure does not successfully
> > persuade
> > the client to testify truthfully, the lawyer must disclose the fact
> that the
> > client intends to lie to the tribunal and, per 4-1.6, information
> sufficient
> > to prevent the commission of the crime of perjury.
> >
> > The lawyer's duty not to assist witnesses, including the lawyer's own
> > client, in offering false evidence stems from the Rules of Professional
> > Conduct,
> > Florida statutes, and caselaw.
> > Rule 4-1.2(d) prohibits the lawyer from assisting a client in conduct that
> > the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or fraudulent.
> > Rule 4-3.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from fabricating evidence or assisting a
> > witness to testify falsely.
> > Rule 4-8.4(a) prohibits the lawyer from violating the Rules of
> Professional
> > Conduct or knowingly assisting another to do so.
> > Rule 4-8.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from committing a criminal act that
> > reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
> fitness as a
> > lawyer.
> >
> > Rule 4-8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving
> > dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
> > Rule 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is
> > prejudicial to the administration of justice. (lack of Due Process of Law)
> > Rule 4-1.6(b) requires a lawyer to reveal information to the extent the
> > lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent a client from
> committing a
> > crime.
> >
> > This rule, 4-3.3(a)(2), requires a lawyer to reveal a material fact to the
> > tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
> > fraudulent act by the client, and 4-3.3(a)(4) prohibits a lawyer from
> > offering false
> > evidence and requires the lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures when
> > false material evidence has been offered.
> > Rule 4-1.16 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the
> > representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional
> > Conduct or law
> > and permits the lawyer to withdraw from representation if the client
> persists
> > in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
> > fraudulent or repugnant or imprudent. Rule 4-1.16(c) recognizes that
> > notwithstanding good cause for terminating representation of a client, a
> > lawyer is obliged
> > to continue representation if so ordered by a tribunal.
> > To permit or assist a client or other witness to testify falsely is
> > prohibited by section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1991), which makes
> perjury in
> > an
> > official proceeding a felony, and by section 777.011, Florida Statutes
> > (1991),
> > which proscribes aiding, abetting, or counseling commission of a felony.
> >
> > Florida caselaw prohibits lawyers from presenting false testimony or
> > evidence. Kneale v. Williams, 30 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1947), states "that
> > perpetration of
> > a fraud is outside the scope of the professional duty of an attorney
> and no
> > privilege attaches to communication between an attorney and a client with
> > respect to transactions constituting the making of a false claim or the
> > perpetration of a fraud." Dodd v. The Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d 17 (Fla.
> 1960),
> > reminds us that "the courts are dependent on members of the bar to
> present
> > the true
> > facts of each cause to enable the judge or the jury to [decide the
> facts] to
> > which the law may be applied. When an attorney allows false testimony,
> (the
> > attorney) makes it impossible for the scales of justice to balance."
> See The
> > Fla. Bar v. Agar, 394 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1981), and The Fla. Bar v.
> Simons, 391
> > So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1980).
> >


Under Fed. R.Civ.P.55(c)
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
Judgment has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b).

Under Fed.R.Civ.P 60(b)
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
Of a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or procee-
dings for the following reasons.
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);(3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-
tion, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
















mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
whether rights arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 36 Stat. 291, 45 U.S.C.A. 51 et seq., could 'be enforced, as of right(1) any deliberate violation of law; (2) fraud or conspiracy; (3) intentional violation of due process of law; (4) deliberate disregard of material allegations; (5) judicial acts without jurisdiction; (6) blocking of a lawful conclusion of a case; and (7) any deliberate violation of the Constitutions of the state or the United States
http://www.ukeepallrights.com/PlainTalk.pdf
INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314; conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery..........Hobbs Act jurisdictional allegations contained in the indictment. The government was required to prove two essential elements to support the Hobbs Act offense alleged in Count 1-"interference with [interstate] commerce, and extortion." Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 , 80 S.Ct. 270, 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 252, 257 (1960). Proof of a connection to interstate commerce is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Hobbs Act conviction. United States v. Alexander, 850 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068 , 109 S.Ct. 1346, 103 L.Ed.2d 814 (1989),
A judge does not have discretion on whether to follow Supreme Court Rules ("SCR"); a judge has a duty to follow SCR. People v. Gersh, 135 Ill.2d 384 (1990). Apparently Judge Mathein has no respect for judges of higher courts; she prefers to rule by the rule of man/woman, rather than the rule of law.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has previously ruled that whenever any judge unlawfully interferes with a person's right to conduct interstate commerce, the judge is guilty of interference with interstate commerce. This Respondent's right to conduct interstate commerce without any restriction has been interfered with by Judge Mathein not complying with Illinois law.
The state judge, however, did nothing to discharge her constitutional duty of care. Id., at 614. In the one case in which we have devised a remedy for such judicial dereliction, we held that the ensuing judgment of conviction must be reversed and the defendant afforded a new trial. Holloway, supra, at 491; see also Wood, supra, at 272, n. 18. That should be the result here. The error occurred when the judge failed to act, and the remedy restored the defendant to the position he would have occupied if the judge had taken reasonable steps to fulfill his obligation


need to be served Due Process Notices such as a Declaration "Affidavit of Commercial Truth", Bill of Particulars, Discovery Disclosure (Subpoena Duces Tecum, See Below), a Show Cause why tort of fraud and deceit [dolus malice] should not issue, and a surety bond with criminal charges assessed" served up to them by Notarial process, bringing the actor/offender into Commercial Dishonor and extra-judicially forcing LIQUIDATION OF THEIR ASSETS!!!!!
Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1746. Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury

Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation,
order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or
permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn
declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in
writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath
of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other
than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be
supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration,
certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is
subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in
substantially the following form:
(1) If executed without the United States: ``I declare (or certify, verify,
or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature)'
(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or
commonwealths: ``I declare (or certify, verify, or
state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. nnnnnnn
The subpoena duces tecum should be contained within a motion titled “motion for discovery and compulsory production of the documents by subpoena duces tecum.” Once served with the motion for compulsory production of documents, the originals are returned to the court and made part of the record, along with a certificate of service. Since the subpoena duces tecum, a common law writ, issues out, under the seal of the court and the signature of the clerk, at your behest, this effectively opens your court. This always triggers a flurry of activity, usually in the form of a motion to quash the subpoenas. If you are the defendant, which you probably are, you must oppose the motion to quash on the grounds that it is your discovery. The tribunals (courts are judicial, tribunals are administrative) really don’t have the authority to quash your subpoenas because they are your common law writ, however, they usually issue an order granting the motion to quash.
You don’t have to know the actual title of the document needed. You can subpoena documents by content, such as “produce a true copy of the contract between the judge and the State of . . . . . . “ or “the affidavit of the accusing officer swearing to my liability to code section . . . .” These are specific enough to be pulled from any record that they may exist within. Another little touch is to add the statement, “If no such document exists, please so declare for the record in this action.” And always state the document is needed for discovery. More than one document can be called out on one subpoena, if they are in the care, control and custody of the same person. Just as the subpoena duces tecum is for specific documents, they are also served on specified, designated individuals. Those individuals can be designated either by name or position, such as “John Mays Smith” or “Director
The continued debt owed to the people is discharged only as it continues not to violate our private rights, and when government fails in its duty to provide protection-discharge its debt to the people, it is an abandonment [delictual fault] of any and all power, authority or vestige of sovereignty which it may have otherwise possessed, and the laws remain the same, the sovereignty reverting to the people whence it came." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
When a government agent trespasses on our private rights, it is a tort and this creates a liability for the government to compensate us for that injury. This comes about because the citation shows no liability of the defendant to the statute they claim you violated. They failed to state a claim because without a swearing to liability there is no claim. I use a traffic citation here as an example because all of the other entanglements with government are handled the same way. IRS, BATF and all the rest of the alphabet soup use the same procedure. On the U.S. level they get a lot more verbose and the paper work is multiplied by a factor of about ten, but the procedure remains the same. Probably the major difference is the U.S. agents will submit an affidavit to either support a claim or to get a "warrant" for someone's "arrest". They will use up several pages swearing that the grass is green and the sky is blue and that water runs down hill. What they will never swear to, is the liability of their target. Usually in such operations the "judge" will require mutual discovery. Once, a friend of mine was going through an IRS prosecution and received a stack of paper nearly 11 inches high as discovery. It was a very impressive compilation of documents, but nowhere in it was anything documenting any liability. The "judge", even though he was operating as a magistrate for the executive branch of government, (a police court) was obligated to inform the defendant of his liability. (The nature and cause of the accusations). He failed to do that. The failure to do this turns the "court" into a kangaroo court (see above) and creates an additional injury. It is a FELONY to use one’s office, de facto or otherwise, in the capacity of a “Debt Collector” to collect a debt without the requisite evidentiary proof of the debt giving rise to the obligation and the resulting liability. Ever hear of “RICO,” or read 18 U.S.C. '' 1951-1968; Page 10 of 17 particularly ' 1961(3)]. Without showing liability on the face of the instrument, the prosecution has failed to state a claim. Under the FDCPA, 28 U.S.C. '' 3001 et seq., without verification of the debt, upon timely demand therefore, SCIENTER and FELONY FRAUD ensues.
A claim is really the affidavit swearing to the liability of the defendant. A "warrant" issued without an affidavit of liability is not a warrant at all. The best that can be said of it is that it is an order to kidnap. To be a real warrant it must be issued upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation (affidavit of liability sworn to by a competent witness). This is what gives the court subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Without the swearing to liability by a competent witness, no court or tribunal can have jurisdiction. It is only the swearing to the liability, whether it is contractual, statutory or anything else that can support a charge of a violation of any kind. If you have no contractual liability, then you cannot violate or breach any contract. If you are not engaged in an activity that renders you liable and therefore subject to a statute, then you have no liability to that statute and therefore lack the requisite intent [mens rea is not longer required, i.e., did you or did you not do the act?] or capacity to violate it. Liability is the only thing that can form a basis for, or give rise to, any charge. The liability of the defendant must be discovered by him and presented, for him to be correctly informed of the nature and cause of any charges or accusations he must face. The failure and refusal to present this liability is a severe tort that must be redressed. Without the swearing to liability an "arrest" is actually a kidnapping. [Kidnap, v. 1 to carry away for the purpose of denying a right. Bouviers law dictionary.] Without the swearing to the liability any "trial" in any court or tribunal is a mockery. Justice is disregarded, perverted and parodied. The refusal(s) to verify the liability and resulting kidnap prevents any lawful process. The court or tribunal is characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, so as to render a fair or impartial [meaningful] proceeding impossible.
Before we leave the topic of liability let's look at the least understood use of a tool to discover liability. Bankruptcy is the best tool there is to discover liability. The whole operation of Bankruptcy is set up to discover liability. It is seldom operated that way, but it is extremely useful tool. The petitioner is really in charge if he hasn't been saddled with an attorney. In bankruptcy the "debtor", or the one filing the voluntary petition, simply places all of his assets in the hands of a trustee to protect while he discovers all of his liability. If the trustee does not properly protect your assets, he is subject to the tort claim act and also he has a bond that can be claimed. The petitioner lists all of the debts that he owes. If there is a question about some claims that have been clogging your mailbox, simply do not list them. If you list someone as a creditor then you have the burden of proof that you do not owe them. It is you that decides who is and who is not a creditor. You send out the proof of claim forms (form 10's) to everyone that might actually have a claim so they may present any evidence of debt they have. Any form 10 returned to the court must be accompanied by evidence of debt or it is a fraud. The meeting of the secured creditors provided for under section 341 of the Bankruptcy code (usually referred to as the 341 meeting) is the time and place for presentment of any liability held and for the petitioner to examine the evidence of debt presented for payment. This is the place where the petitioner gets a chance to look beyond the document presented and either reconfirm or repudiate any liability. This is true even if there is a judgment presented. Judgments must be supported by an affidavit swearing to your liability, or based upon facts presented to the court, in order for the judge to have authority to sign them. Otherwise they are a fraud.
Connecticut Federal Civil False Claims Act & Qui Tam Law (Whistleblower Litigation) News


complaint counter claim or third party claim
motion third party defendants f later
third party defendants s are judges and members, permission from first day limited after answer.
motion for stay 2 weeks
summons form civil sup ct jd-cv-1-revised 1-2000 notice of removal direct
to district
motion to proceed ifp
removal form original court with Motion to for court obtain complete files
pleading pending- no pending motions
mot to request file from orig state
cert of service to company
state courts notice of removal state form complaint attached pleading motion

DEFENDANT’’S MOTION TO REMOVE TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT. Motion to judge to obtain a copy of the file for cases: 1,2.3
1. The complaint may be filed with the Clerk at Bridgeport, Hartford, or New
Haven. All other papers shall be filed at the seat of Court where the docket is
maintained for the case involved.
2. All civil complaints submitted to the Clerk for filing shall be accompanied by a
summons and a Civil Cover Sheet, Form JS 44a or JS 44c. Complaints not
accompanied by a summons and these forms may be rejected for filing by the Clerk.
Upon request the Clerk's office will furnish these forms. Persons filing civil complaints who are in custody at the time of filing, and persons filing pro se, are exempted from the requirements of this paragraph. A Civil Cover Sheet indicating that a jury trial is desired shall not suffice as a demand for jury trial. WHAT DOES????
(b) Place of Filing; Number of Copies

must be filed with the original.

[click here] for document continued

No comments: